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Inflation, Labor and the Law
R. Heath Larry*
The practitioner with long experience in labor law will find the
first pages of this article to be a review of familiar ground. For the
law student, however, a recounting of the past, which he has not
personally experienced, can be useful. This review will also serve as
a necessary predicate for some later thoughts concerning future
trends and choices relating to labor law. These choices, difficult as
they may be, might well be unavoidable.
The basic issue confronting this nation is whether we genuinely
want to maintain a political economy whose dominant characteris-
tics will include those political, economic, social and religious free-
doms which are lacking in economies where the state has become
the overriding influence over every aspect of life. If it is our desire
to maintain a free political economy, then certain choices will be
imposed upon us by the economic and political tides which cur-
rently surround us.That the ebb and flow of economic and political tides has always
done much to influence the direction of the law is well illustrated
by an analysis of how the right to strike has had various meanings
at various times. The judicial and legislative branches of govern-
ment have at times expanded and at other times contracted this
right, as they have read the pressures of the times and circumstan-
ces. Since the right to strike has never been recognized as being
* Vice Chairman, United States Steel Corporation. The writer acknowledges with appre-
ciation the assistance of V.L. Matera, Esq., and his staff in developing the legal documenta-
tion for points which the writer has sought to present. He also acknowledges the constructive
criticism concerning subject matter provided by both J.B. Johnston, Esq., and Mr. Matera.
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constitutionally protected in America,' as it has in some other coun-
tries,2 the courts and the legislature have been free to act.
Even the executive branch has on occasions, very special occa-
sions to be sure, deemed it necessary and proper to move into a
critical bargaining situation in which a strike was either in progress
or threatened.' This interference has even been attempted in the
absence of specific statutory authority.4 Whether the intervention
favored the striker or the struck employer seemed to depend consid-
erably upon the thrust of the then dominant economic and political
trends.
The history of the United States is replete with judicial recogni-
tion that, in the early days of this nation, the right to form, organize
and carry on a business was held in high esteem. On the other hand,
the right of employees to form and organize a union out of concern
over their working conditions was less highly regarded. Unionization
was characterized as a form of conspiracy, a restraint of trade, an
impediment to free competition and a threat to the liberty of
individuals who chose to resist the imposition of unionization as a
precondition to work.'
Throughout the nineteenth century, the courts leaned strongly
against the union movement. They were liberal with the injunctive
process,' and the result was that unionization of employees made
little progress. This was a period when our frontiers appeared to be
unlimited, and capital growth was deemed more important, both
economically and politically, than almost anything else.
But finally the Depression came and, with it, the New Deal.
Suddenly, unions were no longer treated as a threat to society, but,
1. See, e.g., Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 306 (1926); United Fed'n of Postal Clerks v.
Blount, 325 F. Supp. 879, 882 (D.D.C. 1971).
2. E.g., France; see Labor Relations and The Law in France and the United States, V
Michigan International Labor Studies 125 (1972).
3. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), where the Supreme
Court invalidated a governmental effort to avoid a strike during wartime through seizure of
the steel industry on the grounds that the President in the absence of statutory authorization
did not have the power to seize an industry. For an exhaustive list of all governmental seizures
of property-most of which were motivated by a desire to avoid labor strife see id. at 615-28
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
4. Id.
5. State v. Glidden, 55 Conn. 46, 8 A. 890 (1887); Commonwealth v. Curren, 3 Pitts. 143
(Quar. Sess. Schuylkill Co., Pa., 1869); Pittsburgh Cordwainers Case, Mayor's Court of
Pittsburgh (1815); 4 J. COMMONS, A DOcUMENTARY HISTORY OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY
15-87 (1910); C. SUMMERS & H. WELLINGTON, CASES AND MATERIALS IN LABOR LAW 2-11 (1968).
6. C. SUMMERS & H. WELLINGTON, CASES AND MATERIALS IN LABOR LAW 163-68 (1968).
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rather, as a potential political base to be carefully cultivated. The
law reacted promptly. First came the Norris-LaGuardia Act,7
passed in 1932, the major purpose of which was to remove the fed-
eral judiciary from involvement in union organizational drives or in
ensuing collective bargaining. This concept of government neutral-
ity was not to last. The year 1935 brought passage of the Wagner
Act,' and the weight of government clearly shifted to the side of the
unions. The right to use private property, the unfettered liberty to
conduct a business and the freedom of choice of the individual
worker would never again achieve the high place in the total scheme
of things which they had been assigned by the judiciary during the
preceding century.
The basic thrust of the nation's economics and politics had under-
gone a sharp change, and the law had begun to reflect that change.
The exercise of those rights, liberties and freedoms which had
seemed vitally important to the growth of the nation's economy in
earlier years seemed to have failed society. Many people felt ag-
grieved and abused by their exercise; countervailing forces were
then legislatively unleashed. The right to organize, the right to re-
quire the employer to engage in good faith collective bargaining and
the right to strike in support of either, were the tools legislatively
assured to the union movement for accomplishing the "countervail-
ing." Indeed, public opinion at that time was so strong that Con-
gress did not place upon unions a reciprocal duty to bargain in good
faith.' That was to come later.
Today, it is almost inconceivable that the Wagner Act's constitu-
tionality could have been subject to serious challenge.' 0 But, it was
7. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-13 (1970).
8. National Labor Relations Act, of July 5, 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (currently codified,
as amended, at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970)) [hereinafter cited as the Wagner Act].
9. Good faith bargaining requires that the representatives of both company and union
have the authority to conduct meaningful negotiations and to arrive at a bargain although
in the course of such negotiations the representatives may have to obtain approval from other
officials with respect to a position on a given matter or may have to obtain approval with
respect to the overall package. Painters Local 850, 177 N.L.R.B. 155 (1969); Local 525, 171
N.L.R.B. 1607 (1968); Han-dee Spring & Mfg. Co., 132 N.L.R.B. 1542 (1961); Larkin Coils,
Inc., 127 N.L.R.B. 1606 (1960). It would appear inconsistent with the requirements of good
faith bargaining to permit unions to impose membership ratification requirements for ap-
proval of the fruit of the negotiations and thus allow the membership to reject a contract
which had been agreed to. It appears, however, that such a restriction on authority of union
negotiators-if announced in advance-is valid. NLRB v. Painters Local 1385, 334 F.2d 729,
731 (7th Cir. 1964).
10. This writer was midway through law school when the Wagner Act was passed and was
1974
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challenged, and, in fact, barely upheld by a five to four decision."
It should be noted that at the time of this decision the courts were
giving the phrase "interstate commerce" a narrow interpretation, 2
and picketing had not yet been classified as free speech. 3 In 1937,
it would have been difficult to imagine how encompassing these
terms would become. 4
Whatever constitutional qualms some people then had, they did
not bother the President. The advent of the new law was noted in
these words:
Without a constitutional quiver in his freckled right hand,
Franklin Roosevelt last week signed the Labor Dispute Bill.
Then, lighting a cigarette, he leaned back and dictated a state-
ment to the public. "This act," the President said, "defines as
assigned the task of developing a comment upon how the Supreme Court would rule on the
constitutionality of the new law. See Comment, The National Labor Relations Act, 3 U. Prrr.
L. REV. 33 (1936).
11. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). Fortunately, in one sense
for this writer, the Court upheld his own painful prognostication. See Comment, The Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, 3 U. Prrr. L. REV. 33, 48 (1936).
12. It has been well established by the Supreme Court that Congress has the exclusive
authority to regulate interstate commerce under article I, section 8, clause 3 of the Constitu-
tion. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960); Sligh v. Kirkwood,
237 U.S. 52 (1915). To constitute interstate commerce, early courts held, there must exist a
commodity which is the subject of commerce destined to "flow" from one state to another.
Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52 (1915); Turner v. Maryland, 107 U.S. 38 (1883). The Supreme
Court in The Steamer Daniel Ball v. United States, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1871), adopted
this "flow theory." In that case the Daniel Ball, a vessel operating wholly within Michigan,
failed to procure a federal license authorizing it to conduct interstate commerce. Holding the
licensing act to be applicable, the Court stated:
So far as she was employed in transporting goods destined for other States, or goods
brought from without the limits of Michigan and destined to places within that State,
she was engaged in commerce between the States, and however limited that commerce
may have been, she was, so far as it went, subject to the legislation of Congress. She
was employed as an instrument of that commerce; for whenever a commodity has
begun to move as an article of trade from one State to another, commerce in that
commodity between the States has commenced.
Id. at 565. One may wonder whether the Supreme Court is having second thoughts on the
extent to which the concept of interstate commerce has been stretched in view of the Court's
recent decision in American Radio Ass'n v. Mobile S.S. Ass'n, 43 U.S.L.W. 4068 (U.S. Dec.
17, 1974) in which it was held that a state court was not preempted by the National Labor
Relations Act from enjoining peaceful picketing of a foreign flag vessel.
13. In Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), the Supreme Court ruled that picketing
in certain contexts was protected by the first and fourteenth amendments.
14. In earlier times it would have seemed unbelievable to find hospitals included within
the ambit of federal legislation; yet, Congress has done so. See Act of July 29, 1974, 88 Stat.
395. Possibly the constitutionality of this legislation will be challenged but such challenge
would probably be unsuccessful.
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a part of our substantive law, the right of self-organization of
employees in industry . . . It may eventually eliminate a
major cause of labor disputes, but it will not stop all labor
disputes. Accepted by labor, management, and the public with
a sense of sober responsibility and of willing cooperation, how-
ever, it should sbrve as an important step toward the achieve-
ment of just and peaceful labor relations in industry."1
Later, one of the same magazine's writers wryly observed:
Either the President did not believe the virtually unanimous
opinion of labor observers, or he did not care, that the enact-
ment of the Labor Dispute Bill would be followed by a series
of strikes as the AFL sets out to attempt to unionize the coun-
try.I
The years following 1935 were turbulent, as union organizers
swarmed into major industrial centers throughout the nation. The
Wagner Act, on its face, purported to protect the voluntary and
peaceful exercise of the employee's right to self-organization. What
might have occurred had the labor movement manifested no more
than a voluntary and peaceful exercise of these rights is as difficult
to imagine today, as it is to guess what might have been, had the
Act been declared unconstitutional.
What did happen was that twelve years later union membership
had increased four-fold and reached a percentage of membership
practically equal to the percentage of the work force which is union-
ized today. More importantly, unions had acquired a power which
began to raise concerns as to whether the imbalance, earlier thought
to be in favor of employers, had been redressed so far that not only
employers, but employees as well, needed some legal protections
against the forceable exercise of unionism. The result was the enact-
ment of the Taft-Hartley amendments of 1947.17 But the concern
continued to grow during the turbulent fifties, with the result that
after yet another twelve years Congress again exhibited its concern
by enacting the Landrum-Griffin Act."5
15. TIME, July 15, 1935, at 17.
16. Id.
17. Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-88 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as the Taft-Hartley Act].
18. Labor-Management Reporting & Disclosure Act of 1959, Act of Sept. 14, 1959, Pub.
L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.) [hereinafter cited as
the Landrum-Griffin Act].
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Thus, a combination of abuses by some unions, coupled with a
recognition that the legislature had earlier gone overboard to help
them, led to a withdrawal of the right to strike in some instances,
and its procedural qualification in others. For example, it became
unlawful to use the strike to compel employees or self-employed
persons to join a union;' 9 to compel an employer to recognize or
bargain with a particular union when another union had been certi-
fied as the bargaining representative by the NLRB; 0 to compel an
innocent and uninvolved person to cease doing business with an-
other as a part of organizational efforts or jurisdictional squabbles;"
or to compel an employer to assign work to employees who were
members of a particular union.2
Third parties had made it clear, on the political front, that they
were growing weary of the increasing economic injury to innocent
bystanders. The 1947 amendments reflect Congress' realization that
they had to establish legal procedures under which the rights of
unions and employees, with respect to organizational and represen-
tational questions, could be resolved, without resorting to the ac-
tions which inevitably affected the rights of innocent third parties.
Another area in which the right to strike was being qualified was
that of union efforts to impose on employers contract or working
conditions which were deemed contrary to, or at least unsupported
by, public policy. Thus, strikes attempting to force an employer to
collect, or employees to pay, excessive union dues23 were made un-
lawful and enjoinable. 4 Strikes attempting to force an employer to
pay for services not performed, 5 or to compel bargaining over mat-
ters not within the judicially defined realm of mandatory subjects
of collective bargaining20 were similarly dealt with. But, neither the
Congress nor the courts, either at the time of the Taft-Hartley or
Landrum-Griffin Acts, or at any time since, have undertaken any
general prohibition of strikes when the situation was uncomplicated
19. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1), (b)(4)(A) (1970).
20. Id. § 158(b)(4)(C); id. § 158(b)(7)(C) limits the right to picket for organizational and
recognitional purposes to thirty days without the filing of an election petition.
21. Id. § 158(b)(4)(B).
22. Id. § 158(b)(4)(D).
23. Id. § 158(b)(5).
24. Id. § 160(j).
25. Id. § 158(b)(6).
26. NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner, 356 U.S. 342 (1958); Penello v. UMW, 88 F.
Supp. 935 (D.D.C. 1950).
Vol. 13: 203
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by aspects other than basic economic struggles, no matter what
their dimensions.
Certain requirements, which will be referred to as "procedural
requirements," must be followed by parties seeking a change in the
existing terms and conditions of employment.2 7 Failure to observe
these procedural requirements has been held to make the exercise
of the right to strike enjoinable.25
The emergency provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act,2 19 and the
"major dispute" provisions of the Railway Labor Act might also
be considered procedural. Neither set of provisions attempts to out-
law economic strikes. Instead, they only affect the timing of the
strike, and are, therefore, only prerequisites to be met in certain
situations" prior to an economic strike, no matter what its magni-
tude.12 Other than compulsory arbitration, no substitute for the
27. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970).
28. Kaynard v. Communications Union, 72 L.R.R.M. 2876 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
29. 29 U.S.C. §§ 171-82 (1970).
30. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1970).
31. The emergency provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act are set in motion when there is a
strike affecting an entire industry (or substantial part of an industry) engaged in interstate
commerce which, if permitted to continue, will imperil the national health or safety. 29
U.S.C. § 176 (1970). If a dispute between a carrier and its employees threatens to substan-
tially interrupt interstate commerce to a degree sufficient to deprive any section of the
country of essential transportation services, the emergency provision of the Railway Labor
Act is set in motion. 45 U.S.C. § 160 (1970).
32. It should be noted that whether there exists a right to strike under the Railway Labor
Act depends in large part on whether the dispute is "major" or "minor." The National
Railroad Adjustment Board provides compulsory arbitration for resolving "minor disputes."
Thus, courts have recognized comprehensive restrictions upon the right to strike over "minor
disputes." See, e.g., Brotherhood of Trainmen v. Chicago River & Ind. R.R., 353 U.S. 30
(1957).
As exemplified in Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 372 U.S. 284
(1963), courts have similarly barred strikes in "major disputes" prior to the exhaustion of the
formal steps of the Railway Labor Act. In Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, the union
attempted to block the carrier's proposed unilateral changes. The district court found that
both parties, having exhausted all steps called for by the Railway Labor Act, were free to
resort to self help restricted only by the possibility of the appointment of the Emergency
Board. Affirming, the Supreme Court stated:
What is clear, rather, is that both parties, having exhausted all of the statutory proce-
dures, are relegated to self-help in adjusting this dispute, subject only to the invocation
of the provisions of Section 10 providing for the creation of an Emergency Board.
Id. at 291. Thus, the Railway Labor Act restricts in varying degree the right of a union to
strike during both "major" and "minor" disputes.
An interesting question arises as to whether the district court may issue injunctive relief
if the union fails to complete the procedures of the Railway Labor Act prior to strike. Section
2 of the Railway Labor Act provides in relevant part:
It shall be the duty of all carriers, their officers, agents, and employees to exert every
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 13: 203
economic strike has been devised, and that device, at least to this
point in history, has been viewed as an anathema not only by the
parties to collective bargaining, but by the government as well.
Enjoining economic strikes in situations deemed critical to the na-
tional interest was indeed provided for,13 but only while certain
delaying, cooling off or mediating procedures were being indulged.3
Congress, however, has been unable to bring itself to the point of
prescribing standing procedures for the formulation of terms and
conditions of employment to be imposed on the parties when the
parties have been unable to reach their own agreement.35
reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, and
working conditions, and to settle all disputes . . . in order to avoid any interruption
to commerce or to the operation of any carrier ....
45 U.S.C. § 152 (1970). On its face § 2 appears to empower a court to enjoin from disrupting
commerce any party failing to make such an effort. However, the Norris-LaGuardia Act of
1932, 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1970), prohibits federal courts from issuing injunctions against certain
non-violent acts growing out of a labor dispute.
At first blush, the injunctive relief provided under the Railway Labor Act seems to conflict
with the Norris-LaGuardia Act. When an injunction is issued against a strike during a labor
dispute the language of the Norris-LaGuardia Act is violated. On the other hand, since the
Railway Labor Act does not provide any machinery for compelling the parties to bargain
collectively, injunctive relief is a necessary mechanism to protect the substantive rights and
duties created by it.
The Supreme Court of the United States recently resolved this apparent conflict in Chicago
& N.W. Ry. v. Transportation Union, 402 U.S. 570 (1971). In that case plaintiff railway
sought an injunction in federal court barring a threatened strike by the defendant union.
Plaintiff alleged that, while the parties had complied with the formal mediating procedures
required by the "major" disputes provision of the Railway Labor Act, the union had failed
to meet its obligation under § 2 by not bargaining in good faith. Thus, the union had not
fulfilled its obligation under the Act and consequently could not resort to self help. In con-
trast, defendant contended that § 2 was merely a declaration of policy and, therefore, nonjus-
ticiable. Finding for plaintiff the Court held that the good faith provision of § 2 is enforceable
through the issuance of a judicial strike injunction, notwithstanding the anti-strike injunction
provision of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Thus, the Court adopted the changing labor policy
of the nation toward restraint and arbitration as opposed to economic warfare and compro-
mise.
It should be noted that the holding of the Court in Chicago & N. W. could have far reaching
effects. As a result of the existing time-consuming formal steps of bargaining required under
the Railway Labor Act the right to strike may be delayed for a year or more. If, under the
holding of the Court in Chicago & N. W., a party may challenge his opponent's good faith at
the end of the formal Railway Labor Act steps, the right to strike may be delayed even longer.
33. Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 178 (1970).
34. Id. §§ 179-80; Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 160 (1970).
35. It should be noted that ad hoc congressional action may be implemented to eliminate
the strike alternative. Examples of congressional intervention were seen in 1963 (Act of
August 28, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-108, 77 Stat. 132); 1966 (S.J. Res. 186, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1966)); and 1967 (Act of July 17, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-54, 81 Stat. 122).
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The courts, meanwhile, were conducting some experimentation of
their own. The nation was going through a period of post-war
growth, and there was a strong yearning for labor peace, at least
during the term of labor agreements freely arrived at. It was, there-
fore, predictable that the courts might come to feel that encouraging
private parties to abide by their own agreements would be a desir-
able policy. Employers and unions, however, were each-to have
occasion to be surprised by some of the related extensions of such a
policy. First came the cases enforcing a duty to arbitrate even the
question of whether a particular issue was arbitrable when the terms
of a particular agreement empowered the arbitrator to decide the
arbitrability of an issue.36 At the outset of this trend, employers felt
the courts were being quite liberal in inferring the possibility of
implied restrictions and obligations on management-restrictions
and obligations which management felt had not been specifically
envisioned by the parties at the time of the agreement. But then the
other side of the coin appeared. Unions found that the implied
availability of arbitration was matched by an implied duty not to
strike over any issue which could be deemed subject to resolution
by arbitration-a duty which the courts found to be as fully en-
forceable by injunction as if explicitly assumed." Legislative and
judicial expressions of public policy thus became quite clear in
connection with a growing number of aspects of collective bargain-
ing. However, in terms of the basic competitive struggle between
employers and unions over "how much," and the establishment of
36. USW v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); USW v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); USW v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
37. Boys Market Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970), in which the Su-
preme Court, reversing a contrary decision in Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195
(1962) on policy grounds, ruled that strikes could be enjoined when conducted during the term
of a collective bargaining agreement containing a grievance, arbitration and no-strike clause.
(In Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962), the Supreme Court had ruled
that a collective bargaining agreement containing a grievance and arbitration clause con-
tained, by implication, a no-strike clause.) In Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368 (1974)
the Supreme Court ruled that a court could enjoin a strike over alleged "unsafe" conditions
if the strikers were covered by a collective bargaining agreement containing a grievance and
arbitration clause and an implied "no-strike" clause. In light of these developments which
reflect a public yearning for labor peace, at least during the life of a labor agreement, one
cannot help being bemused when reflecting retrospectively upon the earlier attitude of the
courts, when they were sufficiently jealous of their prerogatives that they were inclined to
decline enforcement of agreements to arbitrate disputes which had not yet arisen, as being
executory. E.g., Reuda v. Union Pac. R.R., 175 P.2d 778 (Ore. 1946); 11 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
& 1420A (3d ed. 1968).
1974
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a balance of power consistent with the nation's need to alleviate a
growing inflationary bias in our economy, the law relating to these
central aspects of the bargaining process is both ambivalent and
contradictory.
These characterizations are evidenced in several ways. In the first
place, at the very time that the public and the Congress first became
concerned about the abuses of labor power, and were translating
that concern into the provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act, Congress
had just taken action which was destined to add immeasurably to
the power of unions in their pursuit of higher wages. Just months
before it acted on the Taft-Hartley Act, Congress adopted the Em-
ployment Act of 1946.18 This Act committed the government to the
pursuit of full employment without a corollary commitment to cur-
rency and price stability. The increasing practice of the Keynesian
concepts of looser fiscal and monetary policies to support high de-
mand 9 began to erode the earlier potential for periodically rising
unemployment which acted as an economic brake upon employees'
aspirations and union power. One cannot philosophically be against
full employment. But, so long as this Act continues to reflect the
economic and social policy of the United States, the economic
scenario which was the justification for the Wagner Act's change in
the power balance will never again return.40
Secondly, the public seems to support the continued existence of
a number of conditions which virtually equate the right to strike
with the right to win the strike. These conditions accord strikers
such a degree of economic amnesty from the consequences of their
strike so as to virtually insure an uneven contest.4 Inevitably these
38. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1021-25 (1970).
39. While John Maynard Keynes was primarily an economic theoretician rather than an
economic advocate, his writings have often been cited as the rationale for using fiscal and
monetary policies to achieve a continued high level of employment. He outlined his theories
in a book entitled, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, published in
1936. Keynes' theories are often contrasted with those of earlier laissez-faire or classical
economists such as Adam Smith and David Ricardo.
40. So long as the government is committed to maintaining full employment, the vast
unemployment, with the corresponding decrease in the price that labor can demand for its
services, that occurred during the depression will probably never be approached again.
41. Under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), (a)(3) (1970), an
employer is prohibited from discharging an employee who engages in a strike. In NLRB v.
Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938), the Supreme Court ruled that an employer
may "replace" a striker with another employee and refuse to discharge the replacement at
the end of the strike to make room for the striker. The employer's replacement right has been
increasingly restricted. E.g., NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375 (1967); NLRB v.
Vol. 13: 203
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conditions support an inflationary bias. Yet the public occasionally
becomes so concerned with the impact of bargaining upon employ-
ment costs and prices that our lawmakers claim to find broad sup-
port for price and wage controls,4" despite the fact that such controls
are invariably pronounced disastrous in terms of the distortions
which they impose upon the economy.
Thirdly, when some of our lawmakers are not busy thinking about
impaling the competitive market system upon a reconstituted fence
of wage and price controls, they speculate about the potential for
lower prices through increased market competition, something they
apparently believe can come about by breaking up "large" corpora-
tions.4" Yet, they address little attention to the other side of the
equation where the principal cost pressures arise. "Big" unions,
permitted by law to span entire industries, whose avowed purpose
is to keep the wages and working conditions of employees out of
competition, and whose power enables them to ratchet nominal
wages ever higher, regardless of competition and regardless of what
happens to productivity trends, are rarely considered for such dras-
tic action.
The need to resolve this ambivalence is becoming critical. The
nation can no longer continue to absorb the impact of major settle-
ments which embody a significant inflationary bias. Nor can it con-
tinue to absorb the impact of strikes which enforce inflationary
demands and which interrupt the operations of a major segment of
our interrelated economy for any period of time, thereby limiting
the supply of goods while attempting to increase the supply of con-
sumer money chasing these goods.
As the President has emphasized," we are at a point in time where
something must be done about inflation, and about the capacity of
our nation to maintain its position of leadership within the world's
Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963); Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956).
In addition to the legal protection referred to above, the striking employee may be eligible
for economic assistance at the public expense in the form of welfare benefits, food stamps,
and unemployment compensation. E.g., Carney, The Forgotten Man on the Welfare Roll: A
Study of Public Subsidies for Strikers, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 469.
42. See, e.g., Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, 12 U.S.C. § 1904 note (1970) (now
expired).
43. See, e.g., The Industrial Reorganization Act, S. 1167, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
44. On August 12, 1974, President Ford addressed Congress:
My first priority is to work with you to bring inflation under control. Inflation is our
domestic enemy number one. To restore economic confidence, the Government in
Washington must provide some leadership. It does no good to blame the public for
spending too much when the Government is spending too much.
10 PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1029, 1032 (1974).
1974
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political economy. Possibly, some would call it an exaggeration to
say that we face an economic "emergency," but it is not much of
an exaggeration.
As outlined above, the shape of our law does not now point the
way to viable solutions for this problem. Possibly, this is because we
have previously conceived of national emergencies in quite a differ-
ent context. When the "emergency" provisions of the Taft-Hartley
Act 45 were enacted, World War II was still fresh in our minds. Our
lawmakers were probably thinking only in terms of strikes which
impaired the ability of the nation to support a war or defense effort
deemed vital to its security, and which did so in physical terms.
Some courts have so held. As late as 1971, a federal district court
in Illinois found itself unable to "permit an interpretation . . . that
would include economic injury [as opposed to physical injury] as
a controlling part of the national health or safety.' "I' A dozen years
earlier, such an interpretation had been argued to the Supreme
Court, but it chose then to reserve judgment on the issue.47
Recent trends in international and domestic economic events may
now call for a different approach, because our national "security"
is threatened in ways which were only dimly perceived, if at all,
during the forties and fifties. The sixties and the early seventies
have seen a movement away from armed conflict between major
nations in the traditional sense. Armies and armadas now are weap-
ons mainly for small-nation, area-type conflicts. The presence of
nuclear weapons in the hands of the major powers has forced the
search for "detente. '48
But that is in a military sense. The contest still goes on. The
principal socialist economy still boasts that it will bury us. Though
pressing for detente, it still clings to its stated mission of outdoing
and destroying our "capitalist bourgeois economy," by winning, not
45. 29 U.S.C. §§ 171-82 (1970).
46. United States v. ILA, 335 F. Supp. 501, 507 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 40 U.S.L.W. 2330 (7th
Cir. 1971).
47. In a case involving a historic dispute between the United Steelworkers and the major
steel companies in 1959-a dispute in which the writer was deeply and personally in-
volved-the government, in seeking the Taft-Hartley injunction, insisted to the Court that
the term "national health" as embodied in the Act encompassed "the country's general well-
being; its economic health." The Court concluded at that time that it need not resolve the
question because it felt the judgments below to be "amply supported on the ground that the
strike imperils the national safety." USW v. United States, 361 U.S. 39, 42 (1959).
48. This is roughly analogous to the manner in which reciprocal economic weapons forced
the steel industry and the USW to devise the Experimental Negotiating Agreement (ENA)
which will be commented on later.
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on the battlefield, but on the field of contest over economic and
social progress."
National survival, however, is no less at stake than during an
armed conflict. It is simply being risked on a different playing field
involving the use of political and economic weapons. More impor-
tantly, this kind of contest will be continuous, rather than intermit-
tent, as were "traditional" forms of battle. Thus, a sound economy,
with minimal inflation, has become an ultimate necessity from the
standpoint of national security.
This is of enormous importance to the institution of collective
bargaining-an importance which partakes of two dimensions.
Major strikes during what we used to think of as "peacetime" take
on new significance. Secondly, additional significance is attached to
the economic contents of contract settlements.
49. In a publication authorized by the Soviet hierarchy, one reads the following:
The Soviet Union consistently upholds the Leninist principle of peaceful co-existence
of states with differing social systems, which facilitates the relaxation of tension,
safeguarding of peace and international security.
Novoswi PRESs AGENCY, U.S.S.R.-73 YEARBOOK 93 (1973). Yet just 9 pages earlier the message
was as follows:
The experience of setting up a multinational state of a new type shows that only a
socialist revolution secures a close unification of all the people's forces, led by the
working class with the aim of liquidating the capitalist system of exploitation and with
it the system of national oppression. The establishment of the dictatorship of the
proletariat was the decisive political precondition for carrying out this historic task,
for the moulding of the socialist way of life of the nations and nationalities inhabiting
the country, and the establishment of public ownership of the means of production was
its main economic prerequisite.
Id. at 84.
Moreover, whenever there appears to be a wavering in the process of bolstering the people's
views concerning the superiority of their own social and economic process, prompt steps are
taken. Note, for example, the following which appeared in the Moscow News while the author
was then on a business trip in Russia in the summer of 1974:
THE USSR OVER THE WEEK
The CRSU Central Committee obligated the Party committees and the Rectorates of
the Moscow Higher Technical School and Saratov State University to eliminate the
existing shortcomings in teaching and research activities. The Resolution says in par-
ticular: "To work persistently so that every graduate from a higher school should
creatively master the Marxist-Leninist theory, should consistently strive to add to and
improve his knowledge and apply it in life; that he should possess communist convic-
tions and high moral qualities, and be an ardent patriot and internationalist, a consis-
tent fighter against bourgeois ideology and for the fulfillment of the Communist
Party's policy." The Ministries of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education of the
USSR and the RSFSR have been tasked with the elaboration and implementation of
the measures for the further improvement of the work done by the departments of
social sciences.
Moscow News No. 26 (1225), July 6-13, 1974, at 3, col. 3-4.
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At this point, some union adherents will be protesting that this
writer is trying to lay the full responsibility for the current inflation
on the backs of the unions' pressures for higher wages. Therefore, a
brief comment on the implied linkage is appropriate.
There can be no question that during our current surge of inflation
we have suffered from many other pressures which have simulta-
neously flooded us-the delayed impact of having failed to tax dur-
ing the Vietnam period as if we were really at war; the delayed
impact of the years during which our exchange rates vis-A-vis Eu-
rope and Japan were misaligned; the delayed impact of too many
years in which emphasis had been placed upon consumer incomes
and spending at the expense of savings and capital expansion; the
impact of the decisions of some less-developed countries to change
the relative values between their energy and other raw materials
and our finished goods; the impact of certain misconceived grain
transactions upon the whole gambit of food prices, and so on. Never-
theless, it must be recognized that as the shock waves of these rising
prices become integrated into the permanent cost structure of our
economy through their reflection in wage costs, those wage costs
cannot escape accepting a certain portion of the responsibility for
even today's multifaceted inflation.
Cost-of-living clauses applicable to employees' wages and benefits
may be politically understandable but they are economically insidi-
ous. Unless they are applied to virtually all other income accounts,
including rents, interests, dividends, etc., the capital foundation of
the economy can become seriously weakened. Shortages will
emerge, and prices will be further driven up by demand exceeding
supply.' The point is this: whenever hourly employment costs rise
faster than output per man-hour, no matter what the reason, they
add to unit labor costs and hence to rising pressures on prices. They
have done so in all but two of the last twenty-two years, with an
inescapable inflationary impact.51 We must not forget that employ-
ment costs constitute seventy-five to eighty per cent of all costs for
50. The practice of inserting cost-of-living clauses into a collective bargaining agreement
is generally referred to as "indexing," and denotes a type of inflation accounting by which
the "real" value of all types of income is readjusted and realigned in relation to some specific
index, such as the cost-of-living, wholesale price or some other index chosen by the govern-
ment.
51. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Dep't of Labor, as published in COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC
ADvisoRs, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT TRANSMITTED TO THE CONGRESS FEBRUARY 1974,
at 287.
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finished goods and services in our economy.5
Therefore, the present agitation over a number of new factors, at
least some of which we hope to be temporary, should not be permit-
ted to screen out the fact that our current problems have been long
on the way, and the relevance of labor to these problems has long
been recognized.13 For example, just before the death of Dr. Sumner
Slichter in 1959, there was a good deal of concern about the inflation
of the mid-fifties and much controversy about who or what was
responsible. In one of his widely read publications," dealing with the
question of "whether wages were pushing prices up or were chasing
prices up,"55 he stated that "the evidence made it preposterous to
argue that wages were chasing prices up."5 He went on to say, "If
prices were not adjusted upward, much productive capacity could
not be profitably operated and would be idle." 57 And he concluded,
"Inflation is a method by which the price level is adjusted to rising
labor costs that actually accompanies strong trade unionism and
decentralized bargaining."58
At approximately the same time, the Council for the Organization
for European Economic Competition requested a group of indepen-
dent experts to study the problem of rising prices in Europe and to
report on their findings. They did so in 1961 in the form of a report
entitled, The Problem of Rising Prices. It contained this finding:
"All members of the group were agreed that excessive wage in-
creases secured through negotiations have been a significant factor
in the upward move of prices . ... 1
This emphasis upon the impact of labor is never very popular
politically, and this is a political world. There is, therefore, a natural
tendency to reach for remedies which do not confront labor's impact
head on. Yet, given the multiple contributing causes and deep roots
52. National Income and Product Tables appearing in U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SURVEY
OF CURRENT BUSINESS, SEPTEMBER, 1974, at 8-9.
53. This writer noted that we would be arriving at this point in the course of an article
he wrote ten years ago. Larry, Labor-Management Problems-A Management Viewpoint, 50
U. VA. L. REV. 266 (1964).
54. Slichter, The American Economy-Current Trends, Problems and Prospects, an arti-
cle prepared for publication in the Nihon Keizai Shimbun of Tokyo, Japan, at 6-7 (1959).
55. Id. at 6.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 7.
58. Id.
59. ORGANIZATION FOR EUROPEAN ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION, THE PROBLEM OF RISING PRICES
55 (1961).
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of today's inflation, treating it mainly by use of the traditional
monetary and fiscal tools will simply hasten a recession or depres-
sion of sufficient magnitude to risk a complete political and social
upheaval. Certain other institutions, including particularly collec-
tive bargaining, simply must produce less in the way of upward cost
pressures than they have in the past. The motivation to find answers
may lie in the fact that our failure to deal with inflation will produce
the same risk of political and social upheaval, but for different
reasons.'" We are, therefore, driven to ask whether a sufficient show-
ing of responsibility can reasonably be expected of the parties under
the law as it now exists; and, if not, what changes in the law could
be effective in dealing with either the problem of strikes, or infla-
tion.
Intelligence and fear can, for a time, possibly deter unwise use of
an improper power potential. History is not, however, generally
comforting in this regard, although there have been specific instan-
ces which give some encouragement. The most recent instance oc-
curred in the steel industry earlier this year. The parties"' worked
out their Experimental Negotiating Agreement, which bound them
to use arbitration as an alternative to strike or lockout when negoti-
ating for a successor labor agreement.2 The parties believed that it
represented an intelligent response to a very justified fear concern-
ing the future of this industry which is the economic lifeblood for
both of them. The basis for that fear is detailed in a footnote,63 but
60. Many influential persons from South America, including Pedro Beltrans, former edi-
tor of La Prensa, pled with the United States to realize, before it is too late, the insidious
problems which go with a long-continued inflation. We have, of course, seen government after
government fall, throughout South America, because of the problem.
61. United Steel Workers of America and the major steel producers.
62. Prior to the steel talks this past spring the parties had agreed to subject any impasse
to binding arbitration. When the new contract was agreed upon the parties also extended the
arbitration agreement to cover the 1977 negotiations. See notes 63 & 64 infra and accompany-
ing text.
63. Not since 1959 had there been a general strike in the steel industry. Yet as each
succeeding contract expiration date approached, a crescendo of hedge buying by domestic
customers-both from foreign and domestic sources-would take place. One traumatic result
was more and more steel was imported from abroad even in the intervals between negotia-
tions. Another was that preceding each negotiation, the industry and its employees sought
frantically to meet the inventory desires of customers which were not being satisfied abroad,
with the result that, before others would be called back for a short burst of employment,
inefficient facilities would be brought into use, and other wasteful practices pursued, only to
find, following a peaceful settlement, that the steel companies and thousands of their employ-
ees were practically without work. The parties suffered much of the injury of a strike even
though each negotiation since 1959 had been strike-free. The process was cutting both the
companies and their employees to shreds. In the interest of self-preservation, they had to find
a workable alternative.
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the nature of their response merits full discussion in the text so that
its difference from compulsory arbitration imposed by law may be
more broadly understood.
This requires reemphasis of what the parties chose to do. They
arrived at the agreement of their own free will, because they viewed
it as being completely in their own self-interest. There was no legal
compulsion seeking to impress upon them an overriding public in-
terest in constraint of the pursuit of their private interests. Fortun-
ately, their self-interest happened to coincide with the public inter-
est in avoiding the impact of nationwide steel strikes. Since they did
what they did of their own free will, they were not locked in, as they
would have been by legally imposed compulsory arbitration. They
could choose either to follow or not to follow the same course, an-
other time around. Each party, however, knew the pains of return-
ing to earlier patterns; each knew that the other could force that
return if the negotiations were not sufficiently meaningful. The
emphasis was on negotiations, and not on arbitration. In exchange
for certain precommitments, the parties substituted the right to
resort to arbitration for the right to resort to strike or lockout. They
did not agree to call on arbitrators to make their bargain for them,
any more than an agreement which allows strikes or lockouts if
negotiations fail is an agreement to have a strike or lockout.
The agreement involved real risks to the interests of both parties,
and it was this fact that they relied upon to prod them into reaching
agreement by collective bargaining on their own. The right to force
arbitration presents different risks from the right to force a strike
or lockout, but, nevertheless, very real risks. This was, after all,
what is called "interest" arbitration, rather than "contract" arbi-
tration, and there were no explicit guidelines. Neither party could
be comfortable about what the arbitrators might do." It is now a
matter of historic fact that the parties reached agreement on their
own, just before the deadline date on which either could have taken
the other to arbitration. And I can personally testify that the last
three nights were as sleepless as if the parties had been racing a
deadline for strike or lockout.
64. Arbitrators might adopt the criterion of generally trying to figure out what the parties
might have done had they been facing a strike or lockout; on the other hand, they might have
stepped up to become martyrs as to the cause of subduing inflation; or they might have cast
discretion to the winds to make certain that whatever they decided, they would have enjoyed
the absolute certainty of satisfaction from all of the union constituents.
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The excellent arbitrators we had chosen may not consider our
mutual distaste for turning our problems over to them to be flatter-
ing, but we, the parties, were genuinely relieved in not having to do
so."5 Our bargaining had not been frustrated by the Experimental
Negotiating Agreement; it had been given new life, and we were
satisfied that the results closely enough resembled what might have
emerged from bargaining in the face of the threat of strike or lockout
that we elected to include it for use again in 1977, thus, hopefully
assuring the nation of no national steel strike until 1980. There are
-those who opposed the implementation of the agreement, even to
the point of challenging it in the courts. Fortunately, the courts
upheld the legality and propriety of the agreement, thus permitting
it to be tested by the parties this past summer."
Despite some tentative expressions of approval by a few impor-
tant labor leaders, there has been no rush by the parties in other
bargaining situations to embrace a similar concept." Perhaps others
have not yet identified such an arrangement with their own self-
interest to the same degree as the parties in the steel industry.
Perhaps conditions within our economy simply have to get a little
65. The parties had agreed that either Robert Fleming, President of the University of
Michigan, industrial arbitrator and former law professor, or Benjamin Aaron, educator-
arbitrator, would be the chairman and Sylvester Garrett and Ralph Seward, both long-time
arbitrators in the steel industry, would fill out the panel, if needed.
66. Aikens v. Abel, 373 F. Supp. 425 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
67. A little over a year ago, Paul Hall, the president of the powerful Seafarers Interna-
tional Union, joined those who have spoken up in favor of the concept; he prefaced his
recommendation with these words:
We in the maritime unions know we have the guts and the muscle to fight if we have
to. But maritime strikes have outlived their purposes. One maritime strike is too many,
for whatever the stated reason. If the maritime industry is to be rejuvenated, there
must be no strikes, no work stoppages, no interference with the flow of ships and their
cargo.
BNA DAILY LAB. REP., June 11, 1973, at 112.
In the course of giving support to the concept, David Cole, distinguished lawyer and arbi-
trator has written,
Saying that without the strike, it isn't possible to have collective bargaining . . . is
like saying in international affairs, if we renounce war, we cannot have diplomacy.
Id.
One thing is certain-and that is that the collective bargaining process-with the right to
strike and/or lockout as the motive power for achieving agreement-has not been contributing
to the economic stability which our nation so badly needs. Moreover, as we reported in
recommendations of the National Commission for Industrial Peace published by the Execu-
tive Office of the President this past summer, George Meany, President of the AFL-CIO, has
urged that the time had arrived for both sides to seriously consider abandoning the strike in
contract negotiations in favor of voluntary arbitration.
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more serious before more people will be willing to attack the mythol-
ogy which has surrounded the "right to strike" for so long. We may
not have to wait long.
Although the steel industry approach addressed the problem of
the impact of major strikes upon the parties, their industry and the
nation, it did not reflect any real recognition of the importance of
reducing the contribution of employment costs to inflation. Except,
of course, for the commitment of the parties to joint efforts to im-
prove productivity, their economic settlement simply went along
with the trend of the times. The importance of their productivity
effort should not be under-estimated, but neither should it be over-
estimated. Improving the steel industry's long-term trend rate in
output per man-hour of roughly three per cent, by as much as fifty
per cent (which would be quite an accomplishment) could not do
much to alleviate inflationary cost pressures of employment cost
increases well in excess of ten per cent.
Meanwhile, we must again turn our attention to the question of
what, if anything, might be expected of the law. I feel certain that
the solution does not lie in a law which would outlaw strikes and
provide for the determination of wages and other conditions of em-
ployment either by compulsory arbitration or some other form of
government fiat such as a total system of wage and price controls. 8
That kind of thing simply will not work unless we are willing to
enforce the surrender of our freedom to engage in collective bargain-
ing by means akin to those used by socialist countries, like Soviet
Russia, in order to achieve adherence to governmental decisions.
Such a concept is unacceptable to us. It is an alternative to be
considered only as a means of rescue from anarchy. We are not
there. And our purpose is not to get there. What alternatives are
there? Certainly, there are no easy choices.
There is, of course, the possibility, perhaps even the need, of
addressing an old and emotionally charged subject, namely, the
monopoly power of unions. After all, if we are concerned about a
drift toward state control of our economy, we must be concerned
about how to make our free and competitive economy work more as
68. The experience with respect to public employees in terms of outlawing strikes and
enforcing the results in compulsory arbitration do not suggest that such actions could be the
answer for the normal industrial situation. They have not been entirely successful in the
public domain. Bernstein, Alternatives to the Strike in Public Labor Relation, 85 HARv. L.
REv. 459, 466-69 (1971); Note, Public Employees-The Right to Organize, Bargain and
Strike, 19 CATH. U.L. REV. 361 (1970).
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it was intended to since its inception. Yet, for years we have seen a
legal tolerance for the capacity of unions to withdraw the entire
product of an industry from the market, a power which would never
be tolerated in a business enterprise, and which would only grudg-
ingly be allowed the government in times of total national peril. In
short, what the law has permitted on the labor side is the antithesis
of what the law requires on the industry side. We seem, on the
surface, at least, to have a political consensus in support of a free
competitive market system, but we still seem to lack a consensus
in support of the kind of adjustments in the labor laws which would
be necessary in order to remove this systematic disharmony.
Moreover, it must be acknowledged that any effort to deal with
the monopoly problem might be quite ineffective in dealing with the
problem of inflation unless there were a political consensus to deal
with a number of other factors which tilt the scales in labor's direc-
tion. Such factors include the availability of welfare benefits for
strikers, lenient judicial attitudes toward picketing and strike vio-
lence, and the impact of full employment policies. The political
choices would be hard indeed. Although the consumer contends he
is fed up with the waste and inconvenience of strikes and their
economic consequences, legislators, while eschewing state socialism,
still contend that they cannot find enough support to enable their
making these hard choices. Public discontent is one thing, but its
eruption with enough force to press toward needed changes is some-
thing else. The fact is that there was much pre-election discussion
of various legislative approaches in the opposite direction, i.e., ap-
proaches which would move the economy ever closer to the socialist
pattern of state planning and controls.69
The sum of all of this is that if we are to expect changes in
performance from the institution of collective bargaining, we may
have to expect it to arise from the voluntary efforts of the parties
themselves.70 That may be a blessing, because, if there is still hope
69. Anyone who does not take this observation seriously would do well to check into the
provisions-and the sponsorship-of two items of pending legislation entitled "Equal Oppor-
tunity and Full Employment Act of 1976," H.R. 15,476, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) and
"National Employment Priorities Act," H.R. 13,541, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). The first
would require planning for business by the government in dimensions heretofore quite foreign
to our type of economy. The second would attempt to legislate a two-year notice provision
for plant closings.
70. J. Hodgson, former Secretary of Labor, has written:
Sherlock Holmes used to say that when you eliminate all probable causes for crimes,
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for preserving a political economy in which the parties continue to
have an opportunity to exercise their freedoms with responsibility,
then perhaps we must even now seek our economic solutions
through the voluntary exercise of responsibility. Pursuit of any sig-
nificant structural changes in the law could always result in limiting
the available channels for that exercise in some undesirable way.
Thirty years ago, Philip Murray, the astute and powerful first
president of the United Steel Workers, acknowledged that the use
of raw power of unions in pursuit of the chase was really futile,
because the setting of wages was really an economic function; i.e.,
that the value of wages would be inseparable from the country's rate
of productivity growth.7' Somehow over the years we have lost the
message. Yet the data accumulated over the decades since he wrote
have continued to bear him out. Whether wages in nominal dollars
have increased much or little, the line tracing output per man-hour
has almost exactly paralleled the line tracing real compensation per
man-hour in the total private economy.72
then whatever remains, no matter how improbable, must be the answer. And when we
eliminate all probable substitutes for collective bargaining, then what remains must
be the answer. And what remains is retaining collective bargaining and improving it.
Hodgson, Collective Bargaining in the '70's, in THE SURVIVAL OF COLLECrE BARGAINING 7 (R.
Cowan ed. 1972).
71. Over two decades ago, Philip Murray participated in the writing of a book in which
the following enlightened statements appear:
The employees and their union representatives must realize that the determination of
wages and conditions of work is an economic function and not an arbitrary process
dependent upon the exercise of sheer power.
M. COOKE & P. MURRAY, ORGANIZED LABOR & PROCEDURE 188 (1940).
72. OUTPUT PER MAN-HOUR AND REAL COMPENATION
INDEX 1950 = 100 PER MAN-HOUR, TOTAL PRIVATE ECONOMY, 1950-70
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The lesson is simple, yet hard to learn. We can only pay ourselves
what we produce. An effort to do more turns out in the long run to
be illusory and inflationary. And worse, when the productivity curve
falls flat, as it has recently, while the number of people keeps grow-
ing, there is no way we can avoid a relative decline in living stan-
dards. Likewise, when the scarcity of goods drives prices up, there
is no way by which adding to consumer incomes (wages) can main-
tain purchasing power or help to bring forth more goods at lower
prices.
These concluding pages have smacked more of economics than of
law, but I believe that history shows that the law is bound to follow
economic conditions and accompanying political pressure sooner or
later, and not always in comfortable ways. The point is that unless
the parties voluntarily can learn, and learn soon at that, to cause
their collective bargaining to be supportive of the needs of the na-
tion to constrain inflation, then, because there is no alternative, the
law will do one of several things: It will finally address the problem
of the relative imbalance of power; it will adopt the concept of a
"plague on both your houses" by embracing controls of much
greater stringency and comprehensiveness than any we have yet
seen; or our constitutional concepts will be lost to anarchy or surren-
dered to dictatorship, either left or right.
As earlier noted, the pages of history recount that when the politi-
cal will is lacking to face the discomforts of morning-after econom-
ics, the social and political unrest becomes so strong that a govern-
mental upheaval is unavoidable. Britain, apparently unable to han-
dle a labor-backed challenge to its government, may be about to
provide us a lesson more telling than those we have seen repeatedly
in South America; a lesson we may learn just in time; and a lesson
which could bring self-interest and public interest in solving infla-
tion much closer together than they have appeared to be for the last
crucial decade.
Ours is a tolerant nation. We are inclined to feel that "it can't
happen here." But there are those who would love nothing better
than to bring it about. Our hope must be in the belief that there are
millions who will want to stand up and be counted in order to see
that it does not happen.
Lawyers have long been a bulwark for finding rational means for
solution of abrasions which arise in society. We need their help
today. Their ingenuity, their intelligence, and their perception of
the sweep of history are sorely needed in the task of helping to find
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and encourage more responsible use of freedom, and the develop-
ment of new voluntary mechanics for constructively harnessing the
inevitable competition between the various segments of society of
which Holmes spoke many years ago.73 Our constitutional democ-
racy is close, I feel, to being put to the final test as to whether the
very populist pressures which exist because of its freedoms may soon
force its demise. The nation's lawyers helped it to meet such a
challenge two centuries ago; we need their help again.
73. Justice Holmes offered a sentence which has often been quoted:
One of the eternal conflicts out of which life is made up is that between the effort of
every man to get the most he can for his services and that of society, disguised under
the name of capital, to get his services for the least possible return.
Vogelahn v. Gunther, 167 Mass. 92, 107, 44 N.E. 1077, 1081 (1896) (dissenting opinion).

